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"Strictly speaking you cannot write about music; music expresses what it has
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I. MUSIC SPEAKS
November 9, 1989: the fall of the Berlin Wall--one of the most
significant political events of the twentieth century-was accompanied by
music. Cellist Mstislav Rostropovich was moved by television images of
* Juris Doctor Candidate, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, May 2010;
Bachelor of Music in Piano Performance, Oberlin Conservatory of Music, May 2007;
Bachelor of Arts in History, Oberlin College, May 2007. Thanks to Professors Susan
Williams and Arnie Cox for their invaluable insights, and thanks to Susana Giles for
promising to keep music in my life.
1. Macdonald Critchley, Ecstatic and Synaesthetic Experiences During Musical
Perception, in Music AND THE BRAIN: STUDIES IN THE NEUROLOGY OF Music 217, 217
(Macdonald Critchley & R.A. Henson, eds., 1977) (quoting Sir Jack Westrup).
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East Berliners crossing the Wall and flew to Berlin to give an impromptu
solo recital at the Wall's base.2 For his program, Rostropovich chose works
nearly 300 years old: the Bach3 cello suites.4 Despite the lack of language
or text, the music carried a powerful contemporary message. It was a
consummate statement for freedom and political support, broadcast around
the world.
August 2008: Russia and Georgia clashed in a military conflict that
drew the concerned eyes of the world.5 Again, the event was immediately
followed by music. With distant smoke from burning villages in the
background, conductor Valery Gergiev led a concert in the blacked-out
capital of South Ossetia.6 Gergiev explicitly denounced Georgia's "huge
act of aggression" and praised Russian actions,7 but the concert's assertion
of Russian nationalism was manifest in the music itself.8 The program
included Dmitri Shostakovich's 9 poignant Seventh Symphony, written
amidst the German siege of Leningrad during the Second World War. l0 In a
subsequent interview, Gergiev stated "Shostakovich 'was writing against
evil."'' Here again, music, imbued with both historical and contemporary
relevance, delivered an unmistakable message.
In the United States as well, where art music12 has lost most of its
"cultural capital,"'13 music permeates major political events. Musical
responses to 9/11 included a new work, On the Transmigration of Souls, by
the U.S. composer John Adams, as well as a reading of victims' names at
2. Elizabeth Janik, The Symphony of a Capital City: Controversies of Reunification in
the Berlin Music Community, in BERLIN, THE SYMPHONY CONTINUES: ORCHESTRATING
ARCHITECTURAL, SOCIAL, AND ARTISTIC CHANGE IN GERMANY'S NEW CAPITAL 143, 145
(Carol Anne Costabile-Heming et al. eds., 2004).
3. Johann Sebastien Bach, 1685-1750.
4. Janik, supra note 2; see also ERIC SIBMLIN, THE CELLO SUITES: J.S. BACH, PABLO
CASALS, AND THE SEARCH FOR THE BAROQUE 6 (2009).
5. Michael Schwirtz et al., Russia and Georgia Clash Over Separatist Region, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 8, 2008, at Al.
6. See Daniel J. Wakin, Conductor Defends Russia, to Strains of Prokofiev, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2008, at Cl.
7. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
8. See id.
9. Russian composer, 1906-1975.
10. See Wakin, supra note 6.
11. Id.
12. I will use the term "art music" in this Note as an umbrella term to describe what is
often dubbed the "classical" music tradition. Of course, this description is acutely
simplified. See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 102
(4th ed. 2006).
13. Peter Tregear, For Alle Menschen?: Classical Music and Remembrance After 9/11,
in MusIc IN THE PoST-9/I 1 WORLD 155, 155 (Jonathan Ritter & J. Martin Daughtry eds.,
2007).
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Ground Zero accompanied by Bach's Cello Suite in C Minor.' 4 Samuel
Barber's 15 Adagio for Strings, composed in 1936 and initially criticized for
not being identifiably American, was also performed at Ground Zero, as it
was at the funerals of Presidents Franklin Delano Roosevelt and John F.
Kennedy. 16 More recently, Barack Obama's presidency was ushered in by
the strains of a new chamber work by the American film composer John
Williams.'
7
Such events exemplify the essential role art music plays in the
political world. Music has an unrivaled ability to solemnize events and to
express political sentiment without direct confrontation. This perhaps
begins to explain the U.S. judiciary's assumption that music is a fully
protected mode of expression under the First Amendment. Indeed, the few
judicial opinions that address music in light of free speech have asserted as
much without explanation.' 8 Yet it is far from apparent why music,
particularly music without lyrics, should always be treated akin to political
speech under First Amendment doctrine and theory. After all, without
lyrical content, music is, on its face, devoid of objective meaning.' 9 While
the Supreme Court has yet to develop a thorough rationale for protecting
art as speech,2 ° many commentators have provided excellent theories of
First Amendment protection for visual art.21 Such a task is yet to be
14. Id. at 155-56.
15. American composer, 1910-1981.
16. Tregear, supra note 13, at 160. The Adagio for Strings was also prominently
featured in the soundtrack to Oliver Stone's 1986 film, Platoon. Adagio for Strings, on
PLATOON: THE ORIGINAL MOTION PICTURE SOUNDTRACK (Atlantic Records 1987).
17. Posting of Anthony Tommasini to The Caucus: The Politics and Government Blog
of The Times, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/01/20/a-new-williams-work-for-a-
momentous-occasion/ (Jan. 20, 2009, 15:03 EST).
18. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) ("Music, as a
form of expression and communication, is protected under the First Amendment."); Citizens
Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("Important First
Amendment rights are at stake when music formats are regulated."); McCollum v. CBS, 249
Cal. Rptr. 187, 192 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) ("First Amendment guaranties of freedom of
speech and expression extend to all artistic and literary expression, whether in music,
concerts, plays, pictures or books."); Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578
(S.D. Fla. 1990) (finding music generally protected under the First Amendment, but a song
by 2 Live Crew legally obscene, low-value speech, and thus not protected), rev'd sub nom.
Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134 (11 th Cir. 1992).
19. See Kendall L. Walton, What is Abstract About the Art of Music?, 46 J. AESTHETICs
& ART CRrCIScM 351,351 (1988).
20. Edward J. Eberle, Art as Speech, 11 U. PA. J. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1, 3 (2008).
21. See, e.g., id. (pointing out the uniqueness of art as speech and concluding it should
constitute presumptively protected expression); Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND.
L. REV. 73, 76 (1996) (positing that art performs an essential democratic function of
challenging government); Thomas P. Leff, The Arts: A Traditional Sphere of Free
Expression? First Amendment Implications of Government Funding to the Arts in the
Aftermath of Rust v. Sullivan, 45 Am. U. L. REv. 353, 412 (1995) (concluding that the arts
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undertaken specifically for music. As the Supreme Court declared, "[e]ach
medium of expression, of course, must be assessed for First Amendment
purposes by standards suited to it, for each may present its own
problems.
22
This Note assesses music under the First Amendment by providing a
framework for explaining music's protection as speech. To do so, the
discussion moves from the cultural status of music in society, to current
governmental and judicial approaches to music. Part II surveys
multidisciplinary thought on music to illustrate many of the ways music
functions in society and in individuals. In particular, aesthetic theory is
used to establish the powerful role of music as speech. This power of music
is also witnessed in historical episodes of music censorship from Plato to
Stalin.23 With this background, Part III discusses music in terms of
traditional First Amendment theories and doctrine as a way to concretely
place music within First Amendment jurisprudence. Though theories of
truth value, self-fulfillment, and democracy can explain protection for
music in some respects, no single First Amendment theory fully explains
protection of music as speech. Once the full import of music as speech is
realized, Part IV discusses two cases with implications for music as speech:
National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley4 and Skyywalker Records, Inc.
v. Navarro.25 These cases demonstrate how music as speech both informs
the government's role in music as well as bolsters judicial discussion of
music in First Amendment theory.
Music is everywhere. It pervades daily life, and it has accompanied
major political events throughout history. With calls to establish a "culture
czar" in the United States,26 the unique function of music in society and
First Amendment jurisprudence will be a crucial consideration in any
governmental foray into the world of music. Preexisting free-speech
theories may provide insight, but none fully encompass music's
are a traditional sphere of public discourse subject to the protection of the First
Amendment); Sheldon H. Nahmod, Artistic Expression and Aesthetic Theory: The
Beautiful, the Sublime and the First Amendment, 1987 Wis. L. REv. 221, 221 (1987)
("argu[ing] that artistic expression should be granted independent status as constitutionally
protected speech").
22. Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975).
23. See infra, Part II.
24. 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
25. 739 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Fla. 1990), rev'd sub nom. Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro,
960 F.2d 134 (11 th Cir. 1992).
26. Interview by Elizabeth Blair with Quincy Jones, Jr., Composer/Producer; Robert L.
Lynch, President and CEO, Americans for the Arts; and David Smith, Professor, Baylor
University, in Washington, D.C. for NPR News (Jan. 16, 2009), available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId--99450228); see also William R.
Ferris, Op-Ed., Put Culture in the Cabinet, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 27, 2008, at A25.
[Vol. 62
MUSIC AS SPEECH
multifarious frnctions. 7 Even the doctrine of symbolic speech,28 the most
intuitive candidate for protection of music, does little to protect the full
value of music as speech. Rather, music is a unique mode of expression
that touches upon many different aspects of the First Amendment. As a
protected mode of expression, music must be understood on its own
29terms.
II. BETWEEN SOUND AND MIND
How does music work? For the most part, it remains a mystery. Yet
the importance of music in society is evidenced by its pervasiveness:
"[t]here is no human culture known in modem times that did not, or does
not, engage in recognizably musical activities."30 Indeed, there is concrete
evidence for the antiquity of music-it could be 250,000 years old.31
Today, music imbues nearly every moment of life. We wake up to it, work
out to it, and shop to it. It is in our homes, our cars, and, with the advent of
MP3s and the iPod, we take it everywhere. This Section draws on work in
philosophy, sociology, and psychology to illustrate the indispensable ways
music functions in individuals and communities. With this background,
theories of free speech can then be explored to fully accommodate music as
speech.
What is it about music that grabs our attention and makes it such a
ubiquitous force in society? One theory is that music binds groups of
people together, a useful attribute in the early days of human evolution.
32
Throughout history, music has principally been considered a tool for
collective social purposes.33 For example, it is "often ... connected with
religious and... primitive magical practices. 34 In contrast, only "very few
cultures, and almost exclusively within the confines of the Western world,
have appreciated music for its inherent aesthetic value. 35 Still, even a
27. The portions of this Note dealing with music in First Amendment theory focus on
instrumental art music in order to derive a pure theory of music under the First Amendment
and to avoid conflation with more traditional modes of speech, such as lyrics. Musical
composition, however, necessarily encompasses a wide variety of expression, including
visual art, text, and lyrics. As discussed in Part IV, infra, the theories and discussions here
apply equally to all styles and genres.
28. See infra, Part III.
29. Critchley, supra note 1, at 217.
30. David Huron, Is Music an Evolutionary Adaptation?, in THE COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE OF Music 57, 63 (Isabelle Peretz & Robert J. Zatorre eds., 2003).
31. Id. (speculating from the 1995 discovery of a flute 43,000 to 82,000 years old that
music could be up to 250,000 years old).
32. Id.
33. PAUL HONIGSHEIM, SOCIOLOGISTS AND Music: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF
MusIc AND SOciETY 57 (K. Peter Etzkom ed., 2d ed. 1989).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 59.
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symphony concert can be seen as a ritual: "a celebration, undertaken not
fully awares, of the shared mythology and values of a certain group within
our deeply fragmented society. ' 36 By tapping into a common consciousness
(or subconsciousness), music acts as an identifier and a marker. It identifies
a group and marks an individual as a part of that group.
Musical idioms quickly identify a culture. For instance, Western
music is characterized by a focus on harmony, melody, and form, and,
much like spoken language, it is an idiom learned from birth. Thus, the
uninitiated ear will hear the pentatonic scales of Chinese folk music as
"other." Understanding music is largely based on anticipation, and a person
can only anticipate what is already known. 7 This same concept operates
between music styles within a single culture. Jazz cannot be listened to as if
it were country. Music is extremely effective in separating "us" from
"them," and in creating a sense of solidarity and shared understanding-
even if unconscious-among "us." Like language, these sensitivities appear
to be learned and developed through exposure and function as cultural
markers.
At the same time, there are crucial distinctions between language and
music. Both language and music can be viewed as sound imbued with
meaning, but language holds obvious evolutionary import while some
theorists describe music as mere surplusage, akin to cheesecake.38
Accordingly, "[a] brain devoted to turning sound into meaning is tickled by
an oversupply of tone, melody and rhythm. Singing is auditory
masturbation to satisfy this craving. Playing musical instruments is
auditory pornography. 3 9 Even if this theory has some truth, the pervasive
presence and function of music in today's society cannot be ignored.
Most commentators agree on one thing: music manipulates
emotions.4° While no one yet understands why or how music elicits
emotional response, 4' aesthetic theory provides some insight into the
ramifications of this phenomenon:
Art changes the emotional content of man's consciousness so that he
can react more subtly and deeply to the world. This penetration of
inner reality, because it is achieved by men in association and has a
complexity beyond the power of one man to achieve, also exposes the
36. Christopher Small, The Social Character of Music; Performance as ritual: sketch
for an enquiry into the true nature of a symphony concert, in LOST IN MUSIC: CULTURE,
STYLE AND THE MUSICAL EVENT 6,6 (Avron Levine White ed., 1987).
37. See ROBERT JOURDAIN, Music, THE BRAIN, AND ECSTASY: How Music CAPTURES
OUR IMAGINATION 246 (1997).
38. See Why Music?, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 20, 2008, at 41, 44.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., HANDBOOK OF MUSIC AND EMOTION: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND
APPLICATIONS (Patrik N. Juslin & John A. Sloboda eds., 2010).
41. Why Music?, supra note 38, at 43.
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hearts of his fellow men and raises the whole communal feeling of
society to a new plane of complexity. It makes possible new levels of
42conscious sympathy, understanding and affection between men ....
This passage illustrates how manipulation of emotion not only
manufactures solidarity but also influences perception of the outside world,
introducing a dual function of music: communal and individual.
Aesthetic theory, as applied to music, must take into account music's
unique characteristics. As the conductor Leon Botstein put it, "[m]usic is
unique in that the acts of listening and playing together preserve the
secrecy of emotion characteristic of privacy and intimacy yet at the same
time deepen a sense of human connectedness, even though most
concertgoers are strangers to one another.'A3 While fostering shared
experiences among a group, musical experiences remain quintessentially
individual and private.
Additionally, music is an auditory experience rather than a visual one.
In this way, music is the abstract art par excellence, 44 and, thus, the
ideological art par excellence.45 Visual art, even abstract visual art, must
imitate visual reality to a degree.46 Music, on the other hand, functions
completely on its own terms.47 It is susceptible to a myriad of individual
interpretations and meanings. As musicologist Peter Tregear argues,
"[m]usic above all the other arts is by its very nature radically removed
from the events it might be chosen to accompany." 48 Yet as demonstrated
by the musical performances at the Berlin Wall and after 9/11, music can
also be irrevocably intertwined with real-world events. Finally, nonmusical
arts are far less social than their musical counterparts in that, to be
communicated, nonmusical arts do not always require as many people.49
Only one person is needed to create a painting, but a symphony requires an
army of musicians. One cannot experience a symphony by looking at the
score-a performance of some kind is required.5°
42. George Thomson, Improvisation and Inspiration, in MARXISM AND ART: ESSAYS
CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY 347, 353 (Maynard Solomon ed., 1973).
43. Leon Botstein, Why Music in a Time of War?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1991, at 23, 31.
44. Theodor W. Adomo & Hanns Eisler, Eye, Ear, and the Function of Music, in
MARXISM AND ART: ESSAYS CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY 378, 378 (Maynard Solomon ed.,
1973); see also Walton, supra note 19, at 351.
45. Marcello Sorce Keller, Why Is Music So Ideological, and Why Do Totalitarian
States Take It So Seriously? A Personal View From History and the Social Sciences, 26 J.
MUSICOLOGICAL RES. 91, 99 (2007).
46. See Walton, supra note 19, at 351.
47. VERA L. ZOLBERG, CONSTRUCTING A SOCIOLOGY OF THE ARTS 19-20 (1990).
48. Tregear, supra note 13, at 156.
49. Keller, supra note 45, at 99.
50. The advent of recording technology has, of course, radically changed this paradigm,
but an army of musicians is still required to record a symphony.
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The powers of music may be summarized as threefold: music bolsters
individuality, promotes community (to the exclusion of others), and fosters
transcendence from the mundane. These aspects of music give it its power,
and, consequently, regimes unhampered by the freedom of speech have
sought to recruit music for ideological propagation.5' Inevitably, these
campaigns lead to censorship, and such episodes in history demonstrate
music's function and power beyond the theoretical.
The inclination to censor music has existed since the dawn of modem
society. In The Republic, Socrates asks Adeimantus to determine the
musical modes52 that imitate bravery and peace in order to mold the perfect
citizen.53 Indeed, Socrates would purge his city of all music deemed
harmful to character.54 Socrates believed there was an intrinsic connection
between psychological states and music,55 and, as we have seen, he was not
far from the mark.56 Socrates recognized the inherent power of music.
To censor music is to recognize music's transformative abilities and
its capacity to define a culture: "[c]ultural artifacts carry with them the
power to influence the minds and motivations of the masses, and with it,
the power to divert people from an awareness of and compliance with the
normative behaviors of a society . . . . Because music forms part of
cultural identity, censorship can be seen as a form of cultural protection.
5 8
Music can be utilized in education and social indoctrination. Ancient
China, some ancient Greek states, Nazi Germany, and Soviet Russia "all
considered music an indispensable part of political education." 59 In Soviet
Russia, music was seen as a cultural tool "capable of communicating an
aesthetic of solidarity and universality., 60 In part, this stemmed from
51. See, e.g., MusIc AND MANIPULATION: ON THE SOCIAL USES AND SOCIAL CONTROL OF
Music (Steven Brown & Ulrik Volgsten eds., 2006).
52. Musical modes are classifications of musical scale systems, such as major and
minor. HARvARD DICTIONARY OF Music 535 (Willi Apel, ed., 2d ed. 2000) (1944). The
subtle distinctions in musical modes are no longer apparent to the modem ear because the
original eight basic harmonic modes have since been reduced to two: major and minor,
commonly associated with comparative cheerfulness and sadness. KENNETH DORTER, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF PLATO'S REPUBLIC 84 (2006).
53. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 77 (A. D. Lindsay trans., Everyman's Libr. 1992).
54. Id. at 77-79.
55. See id.
56. See supra note 42; HANDBOOK OF Music AND EMOTION: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND
APPLICATIONS (Patrik N. Juslin & John A. Sloboda eds., 2010).
57. Marie Korpe et al., Music Censorship from Plato to the Present, in MusIc AND
MANIPULATION: ON THE SOCIAL USES AND SOCIAL CONTROL OF Music 240 (Steven Brown
& Uhik Volgsten eds., 2006).
58. Id.
59. HONIosHEIM, supra note 33, at 58.
60. Leon Botstein, Music and Freedom: A Polemical History, in THE PARADOXES OF
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 43,43 (Lord Dahrendorf et al. eds., 2000).
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music's character as a performance art that possesses neither language nor
imagery. Stalin elevated the social and moral aspects of music above
aesthetic considerations.6' Stalinism marked "the first time in any society,
[that] music was drawn into the direct service of government policy. '62 The
government's policy was that "musical works should have a socialist
content, and should be expressed in a readily understood language
addressed to the people at large. 63 Such treatment exemplified mass
cultural identification through music on a national scale.
Similarly, Nazi Germany employed music in "the construction of a
racially pure Aryan identity.'6 4 Nazi leaders elevated musical patronage to
a matter of national priority, though music was conceived not in terms of
aesthetic enjoyment but rather as expression of a national enthusiasm and
pride for the Aryan race.65 Indeed, Joseph Goebbels laid out ten rules for
German music, first and foremost of which was "the battle against
Jewishness in German music.'6 6 Under Goebbels's rules, "Germans were
expected to surround themselves with Aryan music, and were encouraged
to learn to play instruments in order to further glorify the Fatherland and
the Fifhrer. ' ' 67 Musical activity was not confined to concerts but was
promoted as "an integral part of daily living.
68
Music was also employed in the concentration camps. Goebbels's
cultural policy included a concerted campaign against modernism in music,
labeled Entartete Musik (degenerate music). 69 Many "degenerate"
composers were placed in Theresienstadt, a propaganda piece used to
disclaim the final solution.70 In reality, however, Theresienstadt was a
transfer station for death camps in Poland.7' Music was encouraged in
Theresienstadt "as a source of hope and fortitude for the doomed inmates
[there]. 72 Music, however, was put to a much more sinister use at the death
camps. It became a tool for "humiliation, deception, and torture."
73
Hitler's favorite composer was Richard Wagner,74 and Wagner's
61. Korpe et al., supra note 57, at 254.
62. Russian Art Music, in THE NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF MUSIC AND MUSICIANS 380,
384 (Stanley Sadie ed., 1980).
63. Id. at 385.
64. Korpe et al., supra note 57, at 252.
65. HONIGSHEIM, supra note 33, at 201.
66. Korpe, supra note 57, at 253 (internal quotations omitted).
67. HONIGSHEIM, supra note 33, at 201.
68. Id. at 202.
69. Korpe et al., supra note 57, at 252.
70. Id. at 253.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 254.
74. German composer (1813-1883) whose work, The Ride of the Valkyries, was
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music was played so often in concentration camps that, for many, it became
irrevocably associated with the experience of the Holocaust.75 The
sentiment was so strong that Israel instituted an informal ban on Wagner's
music. 7 6 His music was not played in Israel from its founding in 1948 until
conductor Zubin Mehta broke the ban at a Tel Aviv concert in 1981 .7 At
the concert, a stagehand ran on stage, tore off his shirt revealing Nazi-
inflicted scars, and screamed the performance would proceed "over my
body. 7
8
Justice Kennedy referenced these historical examples of music
censorship in a case upholding New York City band shell guidelines
requiring the use of sound equipment and independent sound technicians
provided by the city: "rulers have known [music's] capacity to appeal to
the intellect and to the emotions, and have censored musical compositions
to serve the needs of the state."'79 Nearly every totalitarian regime has tried
to control music in some form, from Hitler and Mussolini to Stalin and
Mao.80 These motivations, without fail, derive from the shared belief that
music influences behavior and identity. 8' From the example of Wagner in
Israel, it is clear that music also has an uncanny ability to assume strong
symbolic power and, consequently, the ability to offend, insult, and injure.
These historical examples evidence the natural desire for governments
to control music. Music has power, yet it is far from clear how this power
fits within the confines of the First Amendment guarantee to freedom of
speech. Justice Kennedy reasoned simply that the Constitution prohibits
anything akin to Nazi Germany or Soviet Russia,82 but those are merely
examples illustrating the power of music. While they are examples to be
avoided, current First Amendment jurisprudence does not so easily
embrace music within its folds.
III. Music IN FREE-SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE
This Note calls for a reasoned basis for protecting music under the
famously put to use by Francis Ford Coppola in the 1979 film Apocalypse Now. See DAVID
P. SCHROEDER, CINEMA'S ILLUSIONS, OPERA'S ALLURE: THE OPERATIC IMPULSE IN FILM 189-
191 (2002).
75. Tracy Wilkinson, Lawmakers Want No Wagner in Israel, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 2001,
at A8; Hanan Bruen, Wagner in Israel: A Conflict Among Aesthetic, Historical,
Psychological, and Social Considerations, 27 J. AESTHETIC EDUC. 99,99 (2003).
76. Terry Teachout, Why Israel Still Shuts Wagner Out, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2009, at
W1.
77. Wilkinson, supra note 75.
78. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
79. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989).
80. Keller, supra note 45, at 110.
81. See id. at 104.
82. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 790.
[Vol. 62
MUSIC AS SPEECH
First Amendment. However, First Amendment theory has developed with a
focus on political speech, and it is consequently difficult to establish a
unified theory that adequately protects the multiple roles of music in
society. Instead, several aspects of First Amendment theory must be
employed to ensure music is fully protected as speech.
A. Truth Through Music
One thing on which the propounders of First Amendment
jurisprudence perhaps agree is the influence of truth theory derived from
the writings of John Milton and John Stuart Mill.8 3 Milton and Mill posited
absolute freedom of the press as necessary to further the search for truth.4
Mill argued that expression of opinion should never be suppressed because
"[w]e can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavoring to stifle is a
false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still."85
Suppressing speech assumes infallibility,8 6 and if history teaches anything,
it is that humans are inherently fallible. For Mill, progress lies in the
conflict between falsity and truth.87 Even if an opinion is false, it prevents
truth from going stale and keeps truth meaningful.88
In applying this theory, courts look to the character of the speech and
identify its truth-value. For instance, obscene speech is seen to have little
truth-value because it does not further a significant truth interest, whether it
is an objective, societal, cultural, political, or aesthetic interest.89 Rather,
obscene speech is deemed to cause more harm than good in the unceasing
search for truth. To have truth-value, however, is to have identifiable
meaning, and, as the abstract art par excellence, music is inherently
difficult to imbue with objective meaning. For instance, Patrick Garry
argues that protected speech "must be an expression of ideas. '90
The slippery nature of meaning in music, particularly any attempt at
objective political meaning, is illustrated by music adopted by the Nazi
83. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 592 (1980)
(citing Mill and Milton); Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
189 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272
n.13 (1964).
84. See JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGmICA 26-27 (Arc Manor 2008) (1644); JOHN STUART
MILL, ON LIBERTY 33-35, 57 (Ticknor and Fields, 2d ed. 1863) (1859). This position, of
course, assumes the existence of an absolute truth and the ability to recognize truth.
85. MILL, supra note 84, at 36.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 88-89.
88. Id. at 102.
89. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20-21 (1973) (quoting Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476,484-85 (1957)).
90. PATRICK M. GARRY, REDISCOVERING A LOST FREEDOM: THE FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO CENSOR UNWANTED SPEECH 115 (2006).
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regime:
The adoption of the Beethoven Ninth by the Nazis, grotesque as it was,
did not damage that work's power to function in the future as a
celebration of human solidarity. Ironically, the power of Richard
Strauss's music has transcended the mean-spirited and petty character
of his politics. Because of its special attributes, music, even in the case
of as warlike and unattractive a character as Wa Ter, reminds us of the
potential for good that resides in each individual.
Still, Zubin Mehta's experience in Israel illustrates the lasting import
musical association and memory can have. The ability of a single piece of
music, such as Beethoven's 92 Ninth, to function as a rallying cry for the
Nazi racial prerogative as well as a universal call to brotherhood93
demonstrates music's ability to portray real meaning and manifests a fertile
battleground for Mill's necessary struggle between truth and falsity.
Many theorists have conceptualized meaning in music as symbolic,
which can be assessed under the Supreme Court's doctrine of symbolic
speech.94 At first glance, it seems First Amendment protection for music
would be found here, but this prospect soon breaks down on both fronts.
Under what is known as the Spence test, symbolic speech occurs when the
speaker intends to convey a particularized message and the surrounding
circumstances provide a strong likelihood that the message would be
understood by those who viewed it.95 In Spence v. Washington, the Court
found symbolic speech in a display of a U.S. flag with a large peace
symbol taped on each side because it was intended to protest the then-
recent invasion of Cambodia and the killings of Kent State University
students.96 Additionally, the Court made clear in United States v. O'Brien
that intent to express an idea alone does not constitute symbolic speech. 97
The Spence test consequently covers only a small subset of musical
performance as symbolic speech, if any at all. Except for unique
circumstances like Rostropovich's performance at the Berlin Wall, it is
unlikely a musician has a particularized message in mind when performing
a piece and even more unlikely that a listener will experience that particular
91. Botstein, supra note 43, at 31.
92. Ludwig van Beethoven, 1770-1827.
93. Botstein, supra note 43, at 31. Leonard Bernstein performed Beethoven's Ninth in
Berlin shortly after the fall of the Wall, and the symphony was immediately enlisted in
commemorative concerts after 9/11. See Tregear, supra note 13, at 163; John Russell,
Tyrants Fall; Art Endures, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 18, 1990, at HI ("At that moment a whole
population looked to the arts and said, 'Speak for us!,' and the arts did not let them down.").
94. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (per curiam).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 415 (noting that "[H]is message was direct, likely to be understood, and
within the contours of the First Amendment.").
97. 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
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idea.98 To relegate musical performance to symbolic speech strips it of its
inherent meaning and power. Music does work on a symbolic level and
often incorporates meaning from extramusical elements, as demonstrated
by Wagner's music in the Holocaust," but this "is seriously at odds with
the phenomenology of listeners' experiences of music's expressiveness....
[W]e experience the sadness of music as present within it.'1°°
Meaning in music lies in the individual experience of it. Sidney
Finkelstein's proclamations on art apply equally well, if perhaps more so,
to music:
A work of art may embrace any kind of ideology or doctrine. Its real
content, or artistic content, however, is its discovered truth, or in other
words the illumination it brings to reality; its disclosure of something
new born out of the old; its crystallization of a stage of growth of the
human being in response to the surrounding world. This truth is
affirmed by the heightened possibilities of life it brings to those who
make it their own.10
Music embraces the objective outer reality of nature and human activity as
well as the "inner, subjective, [and] psychological world of thought" and
emotion. 10 2 To experience music expands the senses and enlarges the scope
of individual life in the world. 0 3 Finkelstein notes that, "[t]he history of the
arts is a record of the successive stages in the humanization of reality.
'04
However, there is a serious argument that this idea of meaning and
truth in music is an archaic notion from a bygone era of musical
understanding. Today, people rarely seek out music simply to soak in its
aesthetic qualities. Instead, our "media-saturated world 105 is awash in
98. While this is the case in the vast majority of scenarios, "many studies have
confirmed that professional music performers are able to communicate particular emotions
to listeners," though these emotions are limited to general categories such as sad or joyful.
Patrik N. Juslin, Communicating Emotion in Music Performance: A Review and Theoretical
Framework, in Music AND EMOTION: THEORY AND RESEARCH 313 (Patrik N. Juslin & John
A. Sloboda eds., 2001).
99. Associative meanings are premised on relationships between music and any number
of non-musical factors. Because such meanings are derived from individual life histories,
they are completely idiosyncratic. However, symbolic meaning derived from shared cultural
experiences can sometimes lead to shared understanding. See John A. Sloboda & Patrik N.
Juslin, Psychological Perspectives on Music and Emotion, in MusIc AND EMOTION: THEORY
AND RESEARCH, 94-95 (Patrik N. Juslin & John A. Sloboda eds., 2001).
100. Stephen Davies, Philosophical Perspectives on Music's Expressiveness, in Music
AND EMOTION: THEORY AND RESEARCH 30 (Patrik N. Juslin & John A. Sloboda eds., 2001).
101. Sidney Finkelstein, Art as Humanization, in MARXISM AND ART: ESSAYS CLASSIC
AND CONTEMPORARY 278 (Maynard Solomon ed., 1973).
102. Id.
103. Id. at279.
104. Id. at 276 (quoting Finkelstein).
105. See GARRY, supra note 90, at 19.
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background music, or utilitarian music. 10 6 The great violinist Yehudi
Menuhin cited this fact in an appeal for censoring music in "zones of
silence."' 0 7 Sounding much like Socrates, he wrote that
(a) [i]n an ideal world it should be possible to protect people from
'music' injurious to the ear, soul and sensibility.
(b) Such music, or muzak, is the deadening refrain piped into lifts,
arcades, restaurants and aircraft to a captive audience who must be
abused in this fashion without consultation.'
08
Unlike the visual arts, music, once emitted, creates a captive audience of
everyone within hearing range. 10 9 There is no way to close one's ears or
turn away. Immanuel Kant described it this way:
Music has a certain lack of urbanity about it. For owing chiefly to the
character of its instruments, it scatters its influence abroad to an
uncalled-for extent (through the neighbourhood), and thus, as it were,
becomes obtrusive and deprives others, outside the musical circle, of
their freedom."
0
It would seem some musical censorship is required to protect freedom and
privacy, and it has been done to an extent through time, place, and manner
restrictions.' Complete protection of music as speech is not a foregone
conclusion. While music certainly can carry objective political meaning, as
with Rostropovich's recital at the Berlin Wall, such incidences are
restricted to particular circumstances. Bach's cello suites were not written
to express universal freedom, and they do not bear such meaning with
every performance today. Each performance and each listener's experience
is inherently individual. Consequently, content, whether or not based in
truth, cannot be the sole determinant in First Amendment protection for
music. Strict censorship of particular music, as advocated by Socrates and
106. See Daniel J. Wakin, While in Surgery, Do You Prefer Abba or Verdi?, N.Y. TIMES,
June 10, 2006, at Al.
107. Yehudi Menuhin, Why should music be censorable?, in AN EMBARRASSMENT OF
TYRANNIES: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF INDEX ON CENSORSHIP 110, 110 (W.L. Webb & Rose
Bell eds., 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
108. Id.
109. The Supreme Court has also developed a captive audience doctrine. See Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988) ("The First Amendment permits the government to
prohibit offensive speech as intrusive when the 'captive' audience cannot avoid the
objectionable speech."). Still, content-based restrictions to protect unwilling listeners from
offensive speech are allowed only where "the degree of captivity makes it impractical for
the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure" and "substantial privacy interests are
being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner." Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422
U.S. 209, 209-10 (1975). Under these restrictions, Menuhin's "zones of silence" would not
qualify.
110. IMMANUEL KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 149 (James Creed Meredith, trans.,
Forgotten Books 2008) (1790).
111. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 782 (1989) (holding New
York City's sound-amplification guideline a valid place and manner regulation under the
First Amendment).
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Menuhin, though not sufficiently protected against by Millsian truth theory
in today's media-saturated world, countervails self-fulfillment principles of
First Amendment theory.
B. You Are What You Listen to
Music is an important tool in defining oneself as part of or outside of
a particular group. A person's musical tastes constitute "who one is" on
many levels: culturally," 2 nationally, 1 3 and individually. Music gives the
individual the power to be whatever he or she wishes."14 It nourishes the
"private domain of the mind."'"15 Music can at once foster a sense of
community and maintain inner emotional privacy!l 16 Indeed, it is precisely
this dual characteristic that underpinned the strict control of music in
totalitarian states and must underpin music's protection under the First
Amendment. If such individual self-fulfillment is accepted as a value
protected by the First Amendment, then all art and music must be protected
under freedom of speech. Yet foundational First Amendment theorists of
self-fulfillment theory have not fully addressed the role of music as self-
realization.
C. Edwin Baker, for example, advocates self-fulfillment and
participation in culture as core First Amendment values, yet the closest he
comes to incorporating music is in mentioning "[s]elf-expressive and
creative uses of speech." ' 17 Of course, it is a relatively easy task to include
musical expression in "self-expressive" and "creative" speech, but this
would reveal nothing of music's relevance to First Amendment principles.
Martin Redish gets much closer in The Value of Free Speech by
112. In very general terms, cultural identification means Western or Eastern, but cultural
identification through music can also be much more specific, such as musical idioms
particular to certain regions or countries.
113. There are national idioms in music and even overt movements to develop a
particularly national musical language. For instance, France experienced a particularly
heated internal debate about true "Frenchness" in music during World War I. See, e.g., JANE
F. FULCHER, THE COMPOSER AS INTELLECTUAL MUSIC AND IDEOLOGY IN FRANCE 1914-1940
33, 58 (2005); JANE F. FULCHER, FRENCH CULTURAL POLITICS & Music: FROM THE DREYFUS
AFFAIR TO THE FIRST WORLD WAR 26, 31 (1999); Carlo Caballero, Patriotism or
Nationalism? Faur and the Great War, 52 J. AM. MUSICOLOGICAL SoC'Y 593 (1999).
114. See Peter J. Martin, Music Censorship From Plato to the Present, in Music AND
MANIPULATION: ON THE SOCIAL USES AND SOCIAL CONTROL OF MuSIC 57, 65 (Steven Brown
& Ulrik Volgsten eds., 2006).
115. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 68 (1982); see also
Botstein, supra note 60, at 53 ("In the romantic era, music created a dream world, a medium
of escape from the terrifyingly rapid industrialization, mechanization, and rationalization of
economic and social life. Music became the vehicle of private subjectivity.").
116. Botstein, supra note 43, at 31 ("Each individual derives a personal pleasure that is
opaque but mirrors the joy of others in the hall.").
117. C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L.
REV. 964,995 (1978).
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recognizing that freedom of speech should protect more than simple
communication." 8 Redish's theory of self-realization requires full First
Amendment protection for two aspects of speech: speech relating to private
self-government and speech relating to the development of human
faculties. Redish places art and music in the latter category, yet this only
recognizes and protects one aspect of music's function as speech.' 9 As
discussed below, music also has an important role in the political order.
While Redish's self-realization is crucial to First Amendment protection of
music, it does not alone support full protection of musical expression.
Rather, it is necessary to discuss music on its own terms.
20
Music is an independent form of expression that functions on many
levels. Music is, not only a crucial tool in maintaining and developing
individual autonomy, but also a force in societal and cultural change.
Marxists tend to view music only as an indicator of underlying change,
121
but music can also be an agent of change. In fact, Plato "maintained that
any change in musical tastes must bring a corresponding change in
regime., 122 In any case, music is a platform from which to challenge
normative cultural standards as well as a platform for individuals to sample
and choose various musical expressions in pursuit of self-realization. In a
way, the ability of music to foster individual privacy and community
participation simultaneously makes it a particularly democratic mode of
speech.
C. Music in a Democratic Order
Democracy theory in First Amendment jurisprudence has also been
widely accepted by the courts, 123 though how music is seen in a democracy
depends on which theory of democracy is adopted. In the classical
republican tradition, government's purpose is the pursuit of the common
good, which is possible only if people are virtuous. 124 Such civic virtue is
118. Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591 (1982).
119. Id. at627.
120. A similar argument has been made regarding visual art. See Eberle, supra note 20.
121. See, e.g., Ernst Bloch, On the Threepenny Opera, in MARXISM AND ART: ESSAYS
CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY 577 (Maynard Solomon ed., 1973); Finkelstein, supra note
101, at 278 (arguing that "[T]he discoveries of the individual artist fix and bring into social
consciousness a changed view of reality that has already been prepared for by the collective
operations of society.").
122. Arthur M. Melzer et al., Introduction to DEMOCRACY AND THE ARTs 1 (Arthur M.
Melzer et al., eds., 1999).
123. See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm. of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530,
534 (1980); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 184-85 (1979); Police Dept. of Chi. v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
124. James Bohman & William Rehg, Introduction to DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY:
ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLrICS ix, xiv (1997).
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learned through participation in social institutions. 25 Fostering virtue
through education is thus a primary goal, and the core of such education
includes music and the arts. 126 Indeed, "[a]rt is the essential vehicle for
moral education partly because, reaching beyond rational precepts and
principles, it is able to appeal to the imagination and emotions and to
present concrete models for imitation. Furthermore, art is concerned with
beauty, and morality or nobility is largely an aesthetic phenomenon.'
127
The same can be said of music.
Music influences the emotional palette of an individual and thus
influences perception of reality. Yet because republican theory recognizes
the power of music to mold and define society, there is also a strong
tendency to censor music. 28 Indeed, Socrates' musical censorship dovetails
with republican democracy theory. Music can take listeners away from
political reality and virtue, particularly in the case of music concerts that
listeners attend to escape from the outside world. If the First Amendment is
seen as a tool to ensure a republican theory of democracy, music may have,
not only a central political position, but also a circumscribed one.
In the alternative model of democracy, the liberal tradition, the
purpose of government is to provide all citizens with equal liberty to pursue
their individual values. 129 This model emphasizes liberty, autonomy, and
individual rights. 3 ° Though "more suspicious of. . .regimentation and
censorship," the liberal tradition has tended to deny music any "official,
political role."' 31 Still, music is often touted as a "countercultural agent" in
liberal democracies, specifically as "one of the few elements of civil
society capable of combating . . . the tyranny of the majority.' 32 Many
modernist aesthetic movements see music not as part of an established
societal structure but as social criticism and revolt, usually accomplished
through provocation rather than contemplation. 3  This, in turn, has led to
the widely held view that art and music are, by definition, criticism and
social protest. 34 Still, while a liberal democracy theory recognizes the
power of music, it does not afford it specific protection.
Democracy theory also has particular treatment in First Amendment
125. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: Civic TRADITIONS IN
MODERN ITALY 86-87, 116 (1993).
126. Melzer et al., supra note 122, at 3.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 171.
129. Putnam, supra note 125, at 86-87.
130. Id.
131. Melzer et al., supra note 122, at 4.
132. Id.
133. See HERMAN RAPAPORT, Is THERE TRUTH IN ART? 9-10 (1997).
134. See id. at lO.
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jurisprudence. Essentially, democracy theory fashions a free-speech
rationale from the practical requirements of democracy itself. For example,
Alexander Meiklejohn begins with the premise that society is made free by
the power to vote. 35 In order to ensure freedom of voting, speech is needed
for gathering information and effectively participating in self-
government. 136 The First Amendment thus only protects speech in the
"political realm," which Meiklejohn broadly defines. 3 7 He maintains that
art and literature are necessary to develop the ability to judge because they
shape personality, values, and attitudes.3 8 Meiklejohn also supports a
strong right to free speech in that, once it applies, there are no
exceptions.139 Thus, Meiklejohn's theory would likely afford music
complete protection, but current First Amendment practice is riddled with
exceptions, such as the time, place, and manner regulations seen in
Ward. 140
Cass Sunstein's democracy theory is more in line with today's
treatment of music in that it adopts the view that individual preferences are
shaped by political process.' 4' Sunstein argues for a free-speech system that
draws its parameters from the constitutional goal of a deliberative
democracy-a society defined by broad attention to public issues, public
exposure to a diversity of viewpoints, and the search for political truth.'
42
Protected speech, then, includes "new information and perspectives [that]
influence social judgments" and behavior. 43 Because a free-market system
does not adequately promote these goals in its dissemination of
information, government regulation must help create the necessary
preconditions for a deliberative democracy.'"
Art music's diminishing capital in today's cultural climate requires
government intervention to maintain at least a minimum level of diversity
in the aesthetic, creative, and emotional decision making that music
135. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS
OF THE PEOPLE 116 (1960).
136. Id. at 116-117.
137. Id. at 117-18, 122.
138. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 135, at 117.
139. Id. at 122.
140. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
141. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 18-19 (1993)
("Politics is not supposed merely to protect preexisting private rights . .. Instead it is
designed to have an important deliberative feather, in which new information and
perspectives influence social judgments about possible courses of action."). As discussed
below, this idea holds a significant place in the structure of the National Endowment for the
Arts. See infra IV; see also 20 U.S.C. § 954(c) (2006).
142. See SuNsTEN, supra note 141.
143. Id at 19.
144. See id. at21.
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enables. Without such diversity, the self-fulfillment and democratic
functions of music would be severely impaired. Indeed, capitalist
production is hostile to certain "spiritual production" such as art, poetry,
and music. 1 45 Still, it is far from clear whether music would be afforded
such a privileged status in Sunstein's system of free expression, focused, as
it is, on "public issues" and "political truth."146
Yet there is a place for music even within a narrow definition of
political speech. Socrates saw music as integral to political well-being, and
some Marxists (though not Marx himself) have included culture and art as
an integral aspect of society's superstructure. 47 For example, Harms Eisler
stated, "all music is as much the reflection of political life as of social
relations, even if this has not been the musician's intention at all. Music is
the product of society, and, in a manner of speaking, the musician acts as
the executive organ of society."'
148
Indeed, music can often function as a surrogate to direct political
speech, particularly when direct speech or diplomacy is ineffectual. The
New York Philharmonic completed a historic tour of North Korea in early
2007, forming the largest group of Americans to be in North Korea since
the Korean War.149 While there is no indication that the visit made headway
on particular political issues such as nuclear proliferation, and Kim Jong-il
did not attend the performance, there were many high-ranking officials in
attendance. 5 ° Song Sok-hwan, the vice minister of culture, called the
concert "an important occasion to open a chapter of mutual understanding
between the two countries."'' In 1958, when political relations with Soviet
Russia were similarly chilled, the young American pianist Van Cliburn
traveled to Moscow to compete in the first Tchaikovsky International Piano
Competition. 152 Van Cliburn walked away with the first prize, dubbed "the
real American Sputnik" by Soviet cultural officials.'53
145. See Karl Marx, The Immanence of Artistic Development, II, in MARXISM AND ART:
ESSAYS CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY 63 (Maynard Solomon ed., 1973).
146. SUNSTEIN, supra note 141, at 19.
147. See ZOLBERG, supra note 47, at 12-13.
148. HENRI ARVON, MARXIST ESTHETicS 19 (Helen R. Lane trans., 1973) (internal
quotation marks omitted). But see HONIGSHEIM, supra note 33, at 21-22 ("[Theodor Adomo]
argues that under capitalism the dominant goal in life is the achievement of success through
work. From this total dedication of man to his work resulted a social evaluation of free time
that is not conducive to the cultivation of the arts. The fate of contemporary serious music is
directly attributed to this phenomenon.").
149. Daniel J. Wakin, North Koreans Welcome Symphonic Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
27, 2008, at AlO.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Anthony Tommasini, Cold War, Hot Pianist. Now Add 50 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
9, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/20O8/O3/09/arts/music/09tomm.html.
153. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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However, limiting protection of musical expression to a strict
definition of political speech would in itself be a form of censorship.
Indeed, as occurred in the Soviet Union, authorities could "tighten the
screws even more and say that apolitical works are not topical and of no
benefit to anybody, or claim that they have no more funds available to
purchase them."'4 Particularly for forms of musical expression that do not
enjoy independent market viability, the ability to limit government funding
on such grounds would leave individuals with little choice in aesthetic and
emotional perspective. New works of music that either implicitly or
explicitly challenge aesthetic norms would retreat further underground.
Additionally, because of music's ready ability to adopt and shed objective
meanings, music would slip in and out of political categories, making such
protection of music temporary at best.
First Amendment protection of musical expression cannot be limited
to notions of political speech, but should be equated with political speech
as indispensable to the First Amendment regime. Protection must be based
in the knowledge that music permeates societies, groups, and individuals
on numerous levels. Once diversity in musical expression is realized as a
First Amendment goal in itself, a government position of laissez-faire
toward art music is unviable. 5
In the mid-nineteenth century, thinkers, such as Jacob Burckhardt,
Friedrich Nietzsche, Matthew Arnold, and Honord de Balzac, argued that
modem economic and industrial progress was responsible for "cultural
corruption and aesthetic . . . degradation.' ' 56 They believed that a society
"driven exclusively by a free market that defined all cultural production in
terms of... profitability" popularized the petty and vulgar in both art and
music, to the exclusion of all else.'
57
This line of thought formed a significant factor in the creation of the
National Endowment of the Arts (NEA) and the First Amendment concerns
of government funding that came with it.' 58 As John D. Rockefeller said,
"democratic government and the arts are, in my opinion, in league with one
another, for they both center on the individual and the fullest development
of his capacities and talents. To free men, the arts are not incidental to life
154. Symposium, Censorship of Music, in THE SOVIET CENSORSHIP 104 (Martin
Dewhurst & Robert Farrell eds., 1973).
155. See Richard Taruskin, Music's Dangers and the Case for Control, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
9,2001,36.
156. Botstein, supra note 60, at 45.
157. Id. at 45; see also JAY E. DAILY, THE ANATOMY OF CENsoRsHiP 35 (1973) ("[G]reat
works of art do not emanate a mysterious essence that attracts the untutored eye of most of
us. If this were so we could end our teaching of literature, art, and music appreciation.").
158. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 172 (1992).
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but central to it."' 59 The challenge, then, is ensuring government
involvement while at the same time ensuring complete protection for music
as speech.
IV. Music, GOVERNMENT, AND THE MARKET
A. Government Funding for Music and the Arts
Government participation in music and the arts is a continuing issue,
evidenced by the recent movement to establish a cabinet position for the
arts.' 60 While a cabinet position for the arts would give much-needed
visibility to music, it also rouses concerns of excess government control in
art and culture. Diversity and individuality are core values in the national
artistic landscape. There is yet to be a precise description of what the role
and powers of a secretary of the arts would be, but if the position is to come
to fruition, the parameters of the powers involved must be carefully
delineated to avoid constitutional issues. The experience of the NEA
provides an illuminating example.
The NEA was established in 1965 as a response to a financial crisis in
the arts, 6' and it was a success. In 1965, there were sixty professional
orchestras; by 1990, there were 210.162 The mobilizing rationale behind
organized federal funding for the arts was to bolster national prestige and
"command respect from other nations.' 63 This goal has been played out in
events, such as Van Cliburn's victory in the Soviet Union'(" and the New
York Philharmonic's tour of North Korea. 165 Additionally, the NEA was
founded to foster national identity as well as an informed and creative
citizenry. 166 While these sentiments mirror the censorship rationale of the
Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, they also parallel the basic functions of
music in society. Because censorship and protection both recognize the
power in music, the NEA is structured to insulate the grant process from
politics.
167
159. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
160. See Interview by Elizabeth Blair, supra note 26.
161. MEDIA AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN A FREE SOCIETY 180 (1973).
162. SMOLLA, supra note 158, at 174.
163. Id. at 172.
164. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
166. SMOLLA, supra note 158, at 172; see also 20 U.S.C. § 954(c) (2006).
167. Robert Brustein, Restricting Art Funding Is Censorship, in CENSORSHIP: OPPOSING
VIEWPOINTS 45 (Lisa Orr ed., 1990). However in reality, the chairperson of the NEA has
absolute control over what projects are given grants. See 20 U.S.C. § 954(d) (2006). The
chairperson has rarely gone against the advice of the twenty-member National Council on
the Arts, which includes fourteen private citizens from the artistic community. See 20
U.S.C. § 955(b)(1) (2005); Elizabeth E. DeGrazia, In Search of Artistic Excellence:
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However, this buffer has not completely avoided controversy. Much
of modem music is consciously designed to shock and disturb in order to
challenge the status quo,168 but music also has the capacity to seriously
offend as with Wagner in Israel. Exceptions have been carved out of First
Amendment protection for speech deemed to have little or no First
Amendment value. The most relevant of these exceptions to art and music
is obscenity, to which the Court has denied protection because its "content
is so offensive to contemporary moral standards. 169 Such a conflict with
"contemporary moral standards" arose in the culture wars of the 1990s.170
The NEA helped fund separate exhibitions of works by photographers
Robert Mapplethorpe and Andres Serrano. 17' The Mapplethorpe exhibition
was designed as a "mid-career summary of work of photographer Robert
Mapplethorpe," including still lifes, portraits, and nudes. 172 Among these
was the "X Portfolio," including a series of homoerotic images and
photographs of nude children. 173 The Serrano exhibit included an image
titled Piss Christ, a photograph of a plastic crucifix submerged in the
artist's own urine. 174
The exhibitions sparked heated controversy because of the public
funding involved, and Senator Jesse Helms proposed legislation in 1990
Structural Reform of the National Endowment for the Arts, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
133, 144 & n.38 (1994) (citing William H. Honan, Two Who Lost Art Grants Are Up for
New Ones, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1990, at C19 (describing NEA records showing that from
1982-89 the chairperson reversed recommendations of peer panels on only 35 out of 33,700
proposed grants)). So the buffer is only a one-person buffer, which is hardly a buffer at all,
particularly because the chairperson is a political appointment. 20 U.S.C. § 954(b)(1)
(2005).
168. Perhaps the most famous historical example is that of Igor Stravinsky's ballet Le
sacre du printemps (The Rite of Spring), which instigated a riot at its 1913 premiere in Paris
due to the primitive, erratic dancing and the violently rhythmic score. Robert P. Morgan,
TWENTIETH CENTURY Music: A HISTORY OF MUSICAL STYLE IN MODERN EUROPE AND
AMERICA 95-96 (1991). On May 18, 1917, Erik Satie's Parade enjoyed a similar reception.
Deborah Menaker Rochschild, 32 PICASSO'S PARADE (1991). In the midst of the most
difficult year of World War I for France, Parade caused a riot in its Parisian audience and
heralded the beginning of a new aesthetic in French music. See Jane Fulcher, THE
COMPOSER AS INTELLECTUAL 83-84 (2005). See also Botstein, supra note 60, at 60; Keller,
supra note 45, at 91.
169. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978) (citing Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476 (1957)).
170. Frank Rich, Ding, Dong, the Cultural Witch Hunt is Dead, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb.
24, 2002, at 36.
171. Comment, Turmoil at the National Endowment for the Arts: Can Federally Funded
Art Survive the "Mapplethorpe Controversy"?, 39 BUFF. L. REv. 231,234 (1991).
172. Jesse Helms, The Government Should Restrict Funding of Objectionable Art, in
CENsORSmIP: OPPOSING VIEwPOINTS 40 (Lisa Orr ed., 1990) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
173. Comment, supra note 171, at 241 n.51.
174. ANDRES SERRANO, PISS CHRIST (1987); see also Michael Brenson, Andres Serrano:
Provocation And Spirituality, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1989, at Cl.
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that would have barred funding for "material which denigrates the objects
or beliefs of the adherents of a particular religion or non-religion, or which
denigrates, debases, or reviles a person, group, or class of citizens on the
basis of race, creed, sex, handicap, age, or national origin."' The Helms
proposal was ultimately rejected, but Congress did pass into law a
requirement that the NEA consider "general standards of decency and
respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public."'176 Four
individual artists who had received advisory recommendations of grant
approval were denied after reconsideration under the new amendment.1
77
The artists filed suit, alleging violation of their First Amendment rights to
freedom of speech.
78
The Supreme Court held that the 1990 amendment did not expressly
exclude any speech because it only introduced factors to consider, not
requirements. 179 The Court also accepted the NEA's implementation of the
new statutory requirements by forming advisory committees with members
from diverse geographic, ethnic, and aesthetic backgrounds.'" So the
problem still lingers: what are "general standards of decency" and how are
they adequately considered in the NEA grant application process? To date,
the NEA has been careful to keep its artistic freedom intact and separated
from Congress while avoiding public controversy.' 8 ' Yet a single
chairperson could change all that by imposing personal aesthetic tastes, or
perhaps more troubling, by imposing politically favorable aesthetic tastes.
Current statutory authority confers the power to do so, but full analysis of
artistic and musical merit under First Amendment values prohibits such an
outcome. If government funding for music must conform to prescribed
standards, government would cease to be a countermarket force in the
nation's artistic vitality. Music's ability to create new worlds and identities
would be curtailed, as would creative progress itself.
Music, acting on both individual and community levels, is a carrier of
aesthetic experience and information as well as markers of individual,
community, and national identities. When considering government
involvement in music, all these characteristics must be taken into account.
175. Jesse Helms, Is It Art or Tax-Paid Obscenity? The NEA Controversy, 2 J.L. &
POL'Y 99, 103 & n.14 (1994) (citing 135 CONG. REc. S8807 (daily ed. July 26, 1989)
(statement of Sen. Helms)); see also SMOLLA, supra note 158, at 176 (internal quotation
marks omitted); Maureen Dowd, Unruffled Helms Basks in Eye of Arts Storm, N.Y. TIMES,
July 28, 1989, at Al.
176. 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (2006).
177. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 577 (1998).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 581-83.
180. Id. at577.
181. See NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS: A HISTORY 1965-2008, at 147-49, 160-
162, 167-68 (Mark Bauerlein & Ellen Grantham eds., 2008).
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The market alone, focused as it is on profitability, does not allow music to
adequately carry out these functions. Popular taste will always be well
represented by the market, and the NEA was designed as part of a
countermarket strategy to enable art and music the greatest freedom
possible to develop and act in the lives of citizens. 8 2 Indeed, art music
itself is a challenge to the dominance of market-driven criteria for
assessment. 8 3 In a way, then, the NEA, when properly managed, is a
vehicle for First Amendment values of truth, democracy, and self-
realization. 184
B. As Nasty as the Market Wants to Be
The market has also garnered its fair share of controversy in
promoting certain musical works. Such controversies have focused on
lyrical content of popular songs, and there is only one instance of a musical
work being declared obscene (which was promptly reversed). 8 1 Still,
courts' discussions of music in this context provides insight into First
Amendment treatment of music and an indication of its status as core
protected speech.
8 6
Perhaps coincidentally, the hip-hop group 2 Live Crew released their
album As Nasty As They Wanna Be the same year as the Mapplethorpe and
Serrano exhibits, though 2 Live Crew met with quite a bit more financial
success, selling 1.7 million albums within a year. 8 7 Financial success
notwithstanding, the claims of obscenity were nearly identical. After citizen
complaints, a sheriff in Broward County, Florida was assigned to
investigate the recording.'8 8 He transcribed lyrics from six of the eighteen
songs for the county court, which found probable cause that the recording
was legally obscene. 8 9 Obscenity is defined by the Supreme Court as
anything that (1) "the average person, applying contemporary community
standards would find.., appeals to the prurient interest"; (2) "depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined
by the applicable state law"; and (3) "taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."' 90 While the standard has
most often been applied to pornography, there is nothing barring its
182. See Brustein, supra note 167, at 46.
183. See Botstein, supra note 60, at 45.
184. See OwEN M. Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 48 (1996).
185. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Fla. 1990), rev'd sub
nom. Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134 (1 lth Cir. 1992).
186. See, e.g., id.
187. Skyywalker Records, 739 F. Supp., at 582.
188. Id. at 582-83.
189. Id. at 583.
190. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
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application to other media.
The sheriff released a notice that store managers selling the "Nasty
recording" would be arrested, and all retail stores in the county soon ceased
carrying the album. 91 2 Live Crew and its record label filed suit. 92 The
district court applied the Miller test and found the recording easily met the
first two prongs: the lyrics appealed to the prurient interest and were
patently offensive. 93 The third prong, whether the work had "serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value,"' 94 at least tangentially
confronted the question of First Amendment value of musical expression.
Interestingly, the plaintiffs turned to the logic of the avant-garde and
argued that advances in artistic technique were of essential social value.
195
Indeed, expanding the range of aesthetic expression, whether accompanied
by lyrics or not, can challenge the status quo as well as inspire individual
imagination and conception of reality, thus furthering the free speech
values of truth, democracy, and self-realization. While the district court
noted that the focus of the obscenity charge was on the lyrics and not the
music, the court was correct in stating that lyrics are an inseparable
component of a musical composition.196 One cannot strip a song of its
lyrics any more than one can strip an opera of its libretto. Despite lyrical
content, the First Amendment analysis was of music. The district court paid
lip service to the foundational assumption that music divorced from lyrics
would garner full First Amendment protection, 9' but such First
Amendment value failed to overcome lyrical obscenity in the court's eyes.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit found there was no evidence to overcome
expert testimony of the music's social value, and the obscenity holding was
reversed. 198
This case represents both the central place music holds in First
Amendment protection as well as the fundamental uncertainty of the
foundation for this protection. Music, whether art music or popular song,
should be afforded full protection as speech. It cannot be neatly placed in a
preexisting category of speech under First Amendment jurisprudence, so a
theory of music as speech must take into consideration the varied roles
music plays in history, culture, society, and individuals. When this is done,
the correct disposition of cases like Skyywalker is clear. To truly protect
191. Skyywalker Records, 739 F. Supp., at 583.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 591-92.
194. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
195. CAROLINE LEVINE, PROVOKING DEMOCRACY: WHY WE NEED THE ARTS 135 (2007).
196. Skyywalker Records, 739 F. Supp., at 595.
197. Id. at 595 ("Initially, it would appear very difficult to find a musical work
obscene.").
198. Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134, 138-39 (1lth Cir. 1992).
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music as speech, the market, like government funding, cannot be confined
by predetermined strictures.
V. CONCLUSION
Music occupies an integral position in modem society and culture-
both the NEA and the market attest to that. It serves First Amendment
pursuits in ways inaccessible to more traditional, objective modes of
communication and language. It imbues both individuals and communities
with identity while presenting a continuous opportunity to challenge
normative values and practices. Because of the multifaceted functions of
music, no single First Amendment doctrine or theory adequately protects
music as speech. Rather, music must be considered on its own terms. If
courts recognize the specific values in music, there would be no question
that all music contains serious artistic and political value under the third
prong of the Miller test.
As in Skyywalker and Ward, courts have implicitly recognized the
value of music but have done so without further discussion. This Note
provides a foundation for that assumption. The role of art and music in
society deserves close attention. Music is easy to write off as
"cheesecake,"' 99 but it plays a much deeper role. Music speaks. Works like
2 Live Crew's As Nasty As They Wanna Be have social value, and if vulgar
lyrics are the price of a vibrant and free musical culture protected by the
First Amendment, it is a low price indeed.
199. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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